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We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expounding.”1 With these words, Justice Antonin Scalia registered 
his disapproval for an increasingly prominent practice: the Su-
preme Court’s citation of non-American law. He is not alone; over 
the past decade, the Court’s use of foreign and international materi-
als has proven deeply controversial,2 attracting both ardent support 
and scathing criticism. Yet, although the Court’s glimpses abroad 
have proven polarizing, America has seen a similar practice flourish 
without controversy for centuries. Since the Founding, America’s 
state court systems—each with its own judicial system and consti-
tutional law—have cited each other when interpreting their state 
constitutions.3 That two seemingly comparable techniques have 
drawn such dramatically different reactions logically suggests the 
question: if one practice is so widely accepted, what justifies reject-
ing the other? Addressing this question, in this analysis I argue that 
there is, in fact, justification for treating these practices differently, 
but that such justification is limited to concerns drawn from the 
practical difficulties each method presents.
Over the past decade, the Supreme Court’s use of foreign ma-
terials has drawn comment from a panoply of scholars. Some, in-
cluding Harold Koh,4Anne-Marie Slaughter,5 and Paola Carozza, 
have touted this practice as a way to improve America’s law and its 
global image.6 Others, such as Roger Alford,7 John O. McGinnis,8 
"
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and Richard Posner have opposed the use of such materials on a 
variety of practical and theoretical grounds.9 In comparison to this 
extensive academic exchange, state court use of material from other 
states has received limited attention, though scholars like Patrick 
Baude and Peter Harris have worked to document the scope and 
pattern of this practice.10 Though I draw from each of these per-
spectives, my analysis ultimately departs from their scholarship as 
it focuses on examining the relationship between these practices. 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify which specific 
uses of non-jurisdictional law are at issue in this essay. In this anal-
ysis, my primary focus is on two judicial behaviors: the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign legal sources as persuasive authority when 
interpreting domestic law, and state supreme court use of out-of-
state sources as persuasive authority when interpreting state law. 
Note that this excludes instances in which such non-jurisdictional 
sources are used to interpret laws that are not domestic,11 such as 
international treaties or the few constitutional provisions explic-
itly requiring reference to non-American law. Instead, this analy-
sis focuses on the practice of citing such authorities to interpret 
primarily domestic laws, such as a polity’s due process guarantees. 
Additionally, this analysis is limited to instances in which non-ju-
risdictional sources are viewed as persuasive not merely due to the 
strength of their argumentation but also by virtue of the kind of 
sources they are, an attribute this essay refers to as “precedential 
persuasive authority.” Though foreign and non-state sources have 
had other uses, it is this specific practice which will be shown to be 
the most fiercely contested and, as a result, most worthy of study.
With this in mind, the structure of my central argument is as 
follows: in the first part of my analysis, I outline the practices de-
scribed above and observe that while they intuitively seem similar to 
each other, state court use of non-state materials is far more widely 
accepted than Supreme Court use of foreign sources.12 Having es-
tablished this, the main argument of the essay focuses on determin-
ing if there is a coherent rationale for accepting state supreme court 
use of non-state sources while rejecting the Supreme Court’s use of 
foreign sources. To do so, I consider the leading objections against 
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the citation of non-American materials and consider whether each 
such argument, if valid, would also apply to state court citation of 
non-state law. Turning first to objections stemming from the prac-
tical difficulties of citing non-jurisdictional legal sources, I contend 
that such arguments furnish a plausible justification for accepting 
state citation of non-state law while rejecting the Supreme Court’s 
use of non-American sources. When I consider arguments inde-
pendent of such pragmatic concerns, however, I reach a different 
conclusion. Assessing objections to the Court’s use of foreign law 
drawn from concerns over national sovereignty, the counter-ma-
joritarian difficulty, legal particularism, judicial arbitrariness, con-
stitutional genealogy, and text and original intentions, I argue that 
all apply equally to both practices in question. As such, I conclude 
that if the pragmatic difficulty of citing law from other nations 
were no greater than that of citing law from other states, then there 
would be no coherent justification for accepting one practice while 
rejecting the other. 
In advancing my argument, Part I of this essay sketches the 
controversy surrounding recent Supreme Court references to for-
eign sources before identifying which specific usage of such materi-
als is at issue in the current debate. In Part II, it is noted that this 
controversial usage seems similar to the widely accepted practice 
of state supreme courts citing each other’s opinions when inter-
preting their own constitutions. Logically, this leads to the central 
question of this analysis: what can justify accepting one practice 
while rejecting the other? Taking up this inquiry, Part III considers 
objections to the use of foreign law drawn from the legal pragma-
tist perspective, arguing that the Supreme Court’s use of foreign 
sources imposes greater practical difficulties than state court use 
of non-state sources. From this, it is concluded that objections 
drawn from questions of practical difficulty provide a coherent jus-
tification for embracing one practice but not the other. With this 
in mind, Part IV considers whether perspectives independent of 
these pragmatic concerns offer additional, independent grounds for 
treating these techniques differently. Here, six possibilities are ex-
amined, namely arguments stemming from: (1) sovereignty (2) the 
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counter-majoritarian difficulty (3) legal particularism (4) judicial 
arbitrariness (5) constitutional genealogy and (6) text and original 
intentions. Evaluating each in turn, I find that none provides a per-
suasive rationale for rejecting the Supreme Court’s use of foreign 
law while embracing state court use of non-state sources. As such, 
I conclude that if the pragmatic costs of these practices were com-
parable, there would be no meaningful reason to accept one while 
rejecting the other.
I. SHIPS IN THE DARK?
Though controversy over America’s use of foreign law is noth-
ing new,13 current debate over this practice stems largely from three 
recent Supreme Court cases: Atkins v. Virginia, Lawrence v. Texas, 
and Roper v. Simmons.14  In each of these cases, foreign sources—
ranging from the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child to the domestic law of the United Kingdom—served as a 
highly visible feature of the Court’s opinion.
In Roper v. Simmons in particular, the majority implicitly 
addressed these growing concerns, going to great lengths to clar-
ify that foreign materials were not controlling on the outcomes 
reached.15 In spite of its avowedly limited scope, however, this use 
of foreign law still proved sufficient to touch off a firestorm of criti-
cism from within the Court itself, academia, and Congress. Not 
content to rely on legislative action, some disgruntled citizens even 
issued death threats against Justices who dared to defend the cita-
tion of non-American materials as legitimate.16 Clearly, the Court’s 
turn to foreign law had touched a nerve.
Yet while widespread criticism reflects the existence of an 
intense and rancorous debate, it overshadows the fact that many 
Court citations of non-American sources are almost universally 
seen as legitimate. An obvious example is the interpretation of 
international treaties, a situation in which even ostensible oppo-
nents of judicial cosmopolitanism like Justice Scalia believe that 
the Court should “give considerable respect to the interpretation 
of the same treaty by the courts of other signatories.”17 Likewise, it 
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is broadly considered appropriate for the Court to cite foreign law 
to illustrate the empirical effects of legal rules, as when William 
Rehnquist cited the impact of European euthanasia laws in Wash-
ington v. Glucksberg.18 As a result, claims that the current debate 
turns on whether or not foreign law should be used are inaccurate; 
instead, the crucial question is which specific uses of foreign law are 
acceptable and which are not. 
With this in mind, one must identify the precise use of non-
American materials that is actually at issue in the present contro-
versy. One possibility is the prospect of foreign law being treated 
as a binding authority, one the Supreme Court would be obligated 
to obey.19 Yet although this position has drawn scathing critiques, 
it is one few serious advocates of judicial cosmopolitanism actu-
ally hold.20 Instead, those who support the use of foreign materi-
als overwhelmingly claim that they should be used as non-binding, 
“persuasive authority.”21 The consensus regarding the question of 
whether foreign law should serve as binding authority in Supreme 
Court decisions, then, seems to be clear: it should not. 
Yet if proponents of the use of foreign sources do not sup-
port treating such authorities as binding, what do they defend? The 
key lies in the term “persuasive authorities,”22 which suggests that 
judges might look abroad not to receive marching orders, but rather 
to seek out insights and ideas from foreign experience. Given that 
innovative judges already cite inspiration found in anything from 
academic treatises to pop songs,23 this use of foreign materials is 
generally viewed as unobjectionable, such that even hardened op-
ponents of judicial cosmopolitanism have expressed some degree of 
acceptance for this practice.24
Taken together, the points of general agreement outlined 
above suggest a beguiling possibility: if the use of foreign law most 
fiercely opposed is one few advocate, and if the practice most often 
advocated is one few oppose, then perhaps nothing meaningful is 
actually at stake in the present debate. Recently, some scholars have 
concluded exactly this, characterizing the controversy as “two ships 
passing each other at night.”25 Yet although recent discussion has 
been couched in rhetoric, the current debate is no mere “storm in 
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a teacup,”26 but instead a substantive disagreement over the role 
of foreign law in American jurisprudence. To understand why, one 
must carefully re-consider exactly what it means for a source to 
enjoy “persuasive authority.”
Because a “persuasive authority” is, by definition, one not bind-
ing on a court’s decision, citing foreign materials from this perspec-
tive initially seems to mollify many of the most scathing criticisms 
of judicial cosmopolitanism. Upon closer inspection, however, the 
claim that non-American materials should be used as “persuasive 
authority” is less informative than it might appear. The reason for 
this is simple: in American jurisprudence, almost no authority is 
binding on the Supreme Court’s decisions. Because of this, the cat-
egory of persuasive authority is one that includes everything from 
the decisions of Federal Circuit courts to comic books.27 As a re-
sult, it is necessary to ask not whether the Supreme Court should 
view foreign laws as a persuasive authority, but rather, what type of 
persuasive authority they will be accorded. 
With this in mind, one must consider an important distinc-
tion within the category of persuasive authority.28 On the one 
hand, some persuasive authorities, such as academic articles, are 
treated as persuasive only insofar as they contain effective or per-
suasive arguments.29 There is a separate category of materials seen 
as persuasive not necessarily due to the strength of their reasoning 
but by virtue of their being produced by a specific entity.30 The 
value judges have accorded the opinions of co-equal courts from 
other jurisdictions, for example, may be thought of as “precedential 
persuasive authority.” The result is a sort of “hierarchy” of authori-
ties, in which some types of “persuasive authority,” such as co-equal 
courts, enjoy a qualitatively greater influence than others.31 As a 
result of this “hierarchy,” even if consensus exists that foreign ma-
terials may serve as some form of persuasive authority, there is vast 
scope for disagreement over precisely where this authority lies. 
As a result, the controversy over the Supreme Court’s use of for-
eign law may best be understood not as “two ships passing in the 
night,” but instead as a substantive debate over the persuasive value 
non-American sources should receive.32 Specifically the contested 
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practice at issue in the current controversy is the Supreme Court’s 
use of non-American sources as a form of precedential persuasive 
authority.
II. SAME DIFFERENCE?
Having identified the practice at the heart of the present 
debate, however, one may be struck by its apparent similarity to 
another feature of America’s legal system: state supreme court use 
of out-of-state sources as persuasive authority. Commonalities be-
tween the practices abound: first, within the American federal sys-
tem, each state is viewed as an “entirely separate jurisdiction” with 
its own laws and constitution, over which no other state has formal 
control.33 Because of this, when state courts cite one another they 
are, in a meaningful sense, citing “foreign” law. Additionally, when 
using non-state materials, state high courts treat one another as 
“precedential” authorities, viewing “sister court” opinions as valu-
able precisely because they come from a certain type of respected 
legal institution.34 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, states 
cite such non-state sources when interpreting “domestic” provisions 
of their laws, such as constitutional guarantees of privacy and due 
process.35 Taken together, these shared features suggest that while 
the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law is uniquely controversial, it 
may not be all that unique.  
To further illustrate the apparent similarity between these 
practices, it is useful to examine opinions that employ the tech-
niques in question. The case of Roper v. Simmons may provide in-
sight into the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law. In holding that 
the execution of minors represented an unconstitutionally cruel 
punishment, the majority observed that:
The United States is the only country in the world that con-
tinues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty…
Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, which every country in the world has ratified save for 
the United States and Somalia, contains an express prohibition 
on capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles …. It is 
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proper that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of inter-
national opinion against the juvenile death penalty.36
In this passage, several important features bear mentioning. 
First, and most obviously, the authorities cited in this passage are 
foreign sources, such as the laws of other nations or the stipulations 
of global conventions that the United States did not ratify. Second, 
the issue at stake in this opinion is a “domestic” constitutional ques-
tion, namely the nature of cruel and unusual punishment in the 
American polity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the sources 
cited in this opinion seem to have been chosen not because of the 
merits of their argumentation but instead because they represent 
the decisions of respected authorities. Indeed, as at least one com-
mentator has observed, the use of non-American sources in this 
decision seems largely devoid of “real analysis” as to why such ma-
terials matter beyond the “force provided by their very existence,”37 
a fact that suggests such materials are meant to serve as a form of 
precedential persuasive authority.
Turning to state supreme court use of sister-state opinions, 
one may examine New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle 
East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.38 In this case, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court held that the state constitution protected free speech rights 
in private shopping malls. In doing so, the Court argued that:
Every state that has found certain of its constitutional free-
speech-related provisions effective regardless of “state action” 
has ruled that shopping center owners cannot prohibit free 
speech. There have been four such rulings: California (general 
free speech provisions), Massachusetts (free and equal election 
provision), Oregon (initiative and referendum provision), and 
Washington (initiative provision). 
In this opinion, one finds many similarities to the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign law outlined above. First, just as the sources 
cited by Roper were drawn from foreign polities, similarly, the prec-
edents employed in this opinion were taken from courts outside 
of New Jersey’s jurisdiction. The “foreignness” of such sources is 
particularly salient in light of the divergent constitutional bases on 
which each cited decision seems to have been based. Second, as 
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was the case in Roper, the issues at stake in this case are primarily 
“domestic,” focused specifically on what speech rights New Jersey’s 
constitution guarantees to New Jersey citizens. Finally, the non-
state materials cited by this opinion seem to have been used not as 
sources of novel legal thinking but instead as precedential authori-
ties, valuable precisely because of their status as the decisions of 
sister courts. As a result, on an intuitive level the Supreme Court’s 
citation of foreign sources in Roper seems comparable to the New 
Jersey Court’s decision in New Jersey Coalition.
As a whole, it would appear that decisions like that of New 
Jersey Coalition are fairly representative. Among America’s state su-
preme courts, non-state precedent is employed in over 40 percent 
of decisions that substantively expand or re-define the state-consti-
tutional rights of citizens.39 
Despite their apparent similarities, however, there is at least 
one critical difference between the practices outlined above: while 
the Supreme Court’s use of foreign sources is deeply contentious 
and widely condemned, state citation of other states is almost 
universally accepted as appropriate. America’s state courts have 
cited one another for centuries,40 and today non-state citations are 
found in almost 35 percent of state supreme court constitutional 
decisions.41 Thus, even as the use of foreign law is viewed as deeply 
troubling and controversial, state court use of non-state sources is 
deemed to be emphatically “unremarkable.”42 
Taken together, the apparent similarities of the practices in 
question combined with the widely divergent receptions they have 
received naturally lead to a simple question: what, if anything, justi-
fies accepting one of these practices while rejecting the other? Un-
less such a rationale can be found, one would be left to conclude 
that if one practice is acceptable, the other should also be permit-
ted. Were such an outcome established, it would provide a compel-
ling argument for changing the way in which one or both of these 
practices should be viewed and employed. As such, the balance of 
this essay will focus on assessing whether there is, in fact, a coher-
ent justification for embracing one of these practices while rejecting 
the other. To do so, one must look to the leading objections against 
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the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign sources before considering 
whether each also applies to state court use of non-state law.
III. PRAGMATIC CONCERNS
 Many of the best-known arguments against the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign law stem from the framework of judicial 
pragmatism. According to the pragmatist perspective, the goal of 
legal decision-making is to craft decisions that reach the best prac-
tical outcomes.43 From this viewpoint, the value of an interpretive 
practice is to be assessed by weighing its pragmatic “error costs” 
and “decision costs” against the consequentialist benefits it offers.44 
Many have objected to the practice of citing foreign law sources on 
the grounds that the pragmatic costs of doing so exceed the ben-
efits.45 
Having presented the general form of the pragmatist argu-
ment against citing foreign law, one must assess whether such ob-
jections apply equally to state court use of non-state precedent. 
One pragmatic argument against the use of foreign law is that it 
could lead to costly, rights-restricting decisions.46 According to this 
argument, because America is more protective of individual rights 
than many other countries, the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law 
may lead to decisions that limit the scope of such rights, an out-
come assumed to be costly.47 Of course, on its merits, the claim that 
such decisions are inherently costly is a dubious one, given that in-
dividual rights are generally protected only at the expense of other 
key interests.48 More important, for the purposes of this analysis, is 
the fact that this objection is equally applicable to state court use of 
non-state sources. Among the states, there is significant variety in 
the rights protections afforded.49 As a result, whenever a state with 
“above average” rights protections cites sister state courts, it would 
seem subject to the same “rights costs” that the Supreme Court’s use 
of foreign law ostensibly entails. As such, it is unclear that objec-
tions drawn from such concerns apply with greater force to the use 
of foreign law than the use of non-state law.
 A second, and potentially more significant, set of pragmatist 
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objections to using foreign law is one stemming from the problems 
of “legal transplantation.”50 According to proponents of this argu-
ment, jurisdictional differences in “constitutional system, structure, 
culture” and “history” make it difficult to effectively cite outside le-
gal materials.51 As a result, the use of materials from foreign courts 
is said to lead to poor outcomes and, as a result, is to be avoided. 
In examining this argument, one finds that by almost any metric it 
appears to apply with greater force to the Supreme Court’s use of 
foreign law than to state court use of non-state material. The first 
area in which this is clear stems from the problems caused by cul-
tural and historical differences. 
 Culture and history wield enormous influences over the le-
gal institutions and meanings a polity adopts.52 Significant cultural 
and historical differences between societies make transplanting law 
costly, complex, and less likely to succeed.53 Even ostensibly simi-
lar countries like Britain and the United States retain significant 
and “indelible” cultural and historical differences that deeply influ-
ence their legal development, thus leading to the danger of legal 
mistranslation.54 When America’s state courts cite one another, 
by contrast, they are drawing from cultural and historical contexts 
that are, by the standards of international differences, almost iden-
tical to their own. Although some minor differences do exist across 
the United States, the seamless mobility, communication and in-
tegration across America’s states mean that any such distinctions 
remain limited. As a result, the problem of “transplanting” the law 
of other American states is significantly less formidable than that of 
employing the laws of other nations.
International differences in governmental structure also pres-
ent problems. If a concept is to be “transplanted” effectively, it is 
crucial that judges understand the framework of the executive, 
legislature, judiciary, and constitutional system that produced it.55 
Within the world community, the wide variety of constitutional 
and governmental institutions makes such a task incredibly daunt-
ing. Profound structural differences are apparent even among the 
democracies most similar to the United States; Britain, for exam-
ple, has no formal written constitution,56 while in Germany courts 
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have far deeper involvement in the legislative process than their 
American counterparts.57 As a result, the use of foreign laws re-
quires a complex and nuanced understanding of radically different 
political arrangements, a fact that greatly increases the chances that 
such sources will be incorrectly applied. Among America’s states, 
by contrast, there is a common set of structural features. Though 
the states vary somewhat in their precise governmental structures, 
each is modeled after the same federal government and, as a result, 
shares many commonalities with the others, including three branch 
governments of executive, legislative and judiciary, formal written 
constitutions, and, with one exception, bicameral legislatures.58 As 
a result, when states cite non-state materials, the possibility that 
differences in structure will lead to error is not very significant. 
 Beyond these challenges, there are also serious questions as 
to American judge’s proficiency in applying foreign sources. Ameri-
can legal education offers little formal training in foreign law.59 
Moreover, many foreign courts do not conduct business in English, 
meaning their decisions must be accessed through potentially un-
reliable translations.60 For the foreseeable future, these logistical 
challenges will make any but the most superficial use of foreign 
legal principles a serious practical challenge, one not present when 
America’s states cite each other’s law. 
An additional objection against the use of non-American le-
gal materials stems from costs to court legitimacy. As the Federalist 
Papers famously observed, American courts have neither “sword” 
nor “purse,”61 and so are effective only if other actors view their de-
cisions as legitimate. Because of this, if the court reaches decisions 
on grounds that the public views as dubious, such decisions impose 
harms to the court in the form of increased non-compliance and 
reduced institutional respect.62 The practice of using foreign law, as 
noted earlier, is one that a large segment of America views as deeply 
troubling. As a result, the use of foreign legal materials may be seen 
as pernicious as it reduces the court’s perceived legitimacy and thus 
its effectiveness. Such an argument is at least partially supported 
by recent empirical surveys, in which the Court’s use of foreign 
law in cases like Atkins, Lawrence and Roper has been shown to 
51Journal of Politics & Society
have caused a loss of “institutional support generally” and a back-
lash against these decisions in particular.63 When states cite other 
states, by contrast, their actions are almost universally accepted or 
unnoticed by the public. As a result, insofar as there are legitimacy 
costs to citing non-jurisdictional sources, they seem unique to the 
use of foreign law. 
Some might argue that the use of foreign materials could have 
practical benefits, such as improving America’s worldwide image 
or promoting human rights.64 Yet even if one were convinced that 
the Court’s use of foreign law could sometimes benefit America’s 
foreign policy, however, such a practice could also undermine vi-
tal national interests. The constitutional structure of the American 
government is such that the executive and legislative branches are 
generally in a better position than the judiciary to determine what 
America’s foreign policy interests are and how they can best be pur-
sued.65 Additionally, even if citation to foreign law provided some 
degree of foreign policy benefit, it is unclear why such advantage 
could not be accessed equally well by using such sources without 
assigning them “precedential” persuasive value, treating them as 
one would law review articles.66 As a result, the policy benefits of 
assigning non-American legal sources precedential persuasive au-
thority seem, at best, quite limited.  
Taken together, the arguments outlined above lead to an im-
portant conclusion: the Supreme Court’s citation of foreign law 
imposes greater pragmatic costs than state court use of non-state 
sources. When citing non-American source, the Supreme Court 
faces a host of uniquely severe practical problems, ranging from the 
dangers of cultural misunderstanding to the difficulties of translat-
ing law from a foreign language to the loss of institutional legiti-
macy. Against such costs, there appear to be few practical benefits 
unique to this practice. As a result, it may be concluded that from 
a legal pragmatist perspective, one can justify supporting state cita-
tion of other states while rejecting Supreme Court citation of other 
nations. 
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IV.  ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS?
 At this point, it has been shown that the framework of judi-
cial pragmatism furnishes a coherent rationale for accepting state 
citation of non-state law while rejecting Supreme Court use of 
non-American materials. Having reached this conclusion, it is im-
portant to question whether any framework independent of such 
concerns might provide additional, independent justification for 
treating these practices differently. This inquiry is important for at 
least two reasons: first, for purposes of theoretical completeness, it 
is inherently important to determine if there are multiple justifica-
tions for treating these practices differently. Second, and perhaps 
more relevant, the pragmatic rationale for treating these practices 
differently is one that may not always be applicable. As time passes, 
it is conceivable that the pragmatic challenges of citing foreign law 
will eventually be greatly reduced, rendering practical objections 
largely obsolete. As such, it is crucial to consider whether there are 
additional frameworks under which the Court’s use of foreign law 
can coherently be treated differently than state court citation of 
non-state law.
Sovereignty
Many argue that the citation of foreign law undermines 
American sovereignty. As typically presented, this “sovereigntist” 
argument begins from the premise that to be considered sovereign-
ty, a polity’s constitution and laws must be determined by its own 
people. If foreign sources were assigned legal weight, however, the 
rights of Americans would be subject to “laws made elsewhere,”67 
since Court rulings might hinge on courts outside of national bor-
ders. Thus, the use of non-American materials is said to undermine 
American sovereignty.  
When compared to national governments, some might claim 
that American states are not meaningfully sovereign. America’s 
states lack the ability to make many decisions about the rules of 
their polity, such as whether or not to permit free speech. More 
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specifically, state courts are expected to base many rulings on sourc-
es outside of the state polity, such as the Federal Constitution. 
Ultimately, however, this line of argument belies a deep mis-
understanding of America’s federal system. Under American fed-
eralism, each state is an independent political entity whose people 
fully control their state “constitution, laws, and judiciary.”68  This 
authority is clearly at work when courts must interpret state-con-
stitutional provisions that have no federal analogue, such as Ne-
vada’s right to a public education.69 Moreover, even in areas where 
the Federal Constitution establishes a national rights “floor,” such 
as protection from slavery, this does not mean that states lack sov-
ereign authority over their own constitutional law; such national 
“floors” are instead the function of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution.70  In all cases, states retain complete sov-
ereignty over their own constitution. Accordingly, if the Supreme 
Court’s use of foreign law problematically undermines national 




A second objection to the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law 
stems from the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.”72 The “counter-
majoritarian difficulty” begins from the intuition that when the 
majority of a democratic polity expresses its preferences, this pref-
erence should be enacted. From this perspective, judicial review is 
problematic as it allows judges to strike down policies that enjoy 
majority support, hence the “difficulty.”
In applying this argument against the use foreign sources, 
some argue that looking abroad poses an especially pernicious “in-
ternational counter-majoritarian difficulty.”73 In a basic formula-
tion, the term “international countermajoritarian difficulty” might 
mean that when courts cite foreign law to strike down domestic 
laws, they contradict the people’s will. In this formulation, the “in-
ternational” difficulty seems no different from the problems posed 
by any method of constitutional interpretation; the majority’s will 
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is no more thwarted by foreign law than if it were struck down 
based on any other interpretive modality. More pertinently, this 
sort of “international countermajoritarian difficulty” seems indis-
tinguishable from an “interstate counter-majoritarian difficulty”; in 
both cases, majority will is equally frustrated. 
 In a more nuanced formulation, perhaps the “international 
countermajoritarian difficulty” is that foreign legal sources are 
uniquely counter-majoritarian since they stem wholly from “outside 
the structure of American government.”74 Once again, however, it is 
unclear why this objection does not apply equally to state court use 
of non-state law. As noted previously, the citizens of each American 
state have “no control over one another’s decisions.”75 Simply put, 
the laws of other states are as far “outside the structure” of state 
control as the laws of a foreign nation. As a result, any uniquely 
counter-majoritarian difficulty raised by the citation of foreign law 
does not seem different from that imposed by states citing other 
states.
Legal Particularism
A third set of objections to the Supreme Court’s use of for-
eign sources is drawn from the  “legal particularist” paradigm. Pro-
ponents of this framework argue that each polity has an irreduc-
ibly unique culture and history.76  Thus, the use of foreign law is 
inherently unacceptable, since such law is, by definition, foreign 
to the national socio-cultural consciousness.77 Broadly speaking, 
the legal particularist argument takes two forms. One possibility 
is that national constitutional law is so bound to a specific culture 
and history that polities can never cite other legal systems. This 
“strong” legal particularism would clearly militate against the use 
of foreign law. However, it would also forbid state courts from us-
ing non-state law; each American state has a unique historical and 
cultural narrative,78 and a unique philosophy toward democratic 
government, suggesting that a “strong” particularist would oppose 
the use of non-state sources.79 
As a second possibility, a “weak” legal particularist might ar-
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gue that when the cultural and political narratives of two polities 
differ significantly, then they should not use one another’s laws. If 
such narratives are relatively similar, however, then polities could 
permissibly cite each other’s laws. Such an approach could explain 
why America’s states, which share common commerce, informa-
tion, ideas, art, and histories, may cite each other, while foreign na-
tions may not.80  However, in its “weak” form, the legal particularist 
argument is indistinguishable from the pragmatic “transplant prob-
lem” noted earlier in this essay. Simply put, the force of the “weak 
particularist” perspective hinges wholly on the practical question 
of precisely how different two cultures are. Accordingly, legal par-
ticularism does not offer a unique justification for treating these 
practices differently from each other.81
Arbitrariness
When opposing the use of foreign sources, many cite the 
danger of increased judicial arbitrariness. Proponents of this view 
fear that capricious judges will be able to justify any outcome they 
desire by “cherry picking” laws they agree with from the vast ar-
ray of foreign legal systems.82 Regardless of the analytical merits 
of this claim, it, too, seems equally applicable to state court citation 
of other states’ law. When a state court judge looks to other states, 
he is presented with forty-nine complete legal systems that vary 
tremendously in their precedent, case law, and constitutional struc-
tures. The result is an abundance of sources for any state court to 
“cherry pick,” especially when facing questions controversial enough 
to reach a state’s highest tribunal. Against this backdrop, it is un-
clear that potential for arbitrariness is qualitatively greater when 
looking abroad than when looking beyond state borders. 
Constitutional Genealogy
A fifth objection to the Supreme Court’s use of foreign law 
stems from the framework of constitutional genealogy. Often, a 
polity’s constitution is largely taken from pre-existing charters,83 
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as when Oregon’s founders largely adopted the Indiana State Con-
stitution.84 Because of these “relationships of descent and history,” 
some argue that polities are justified in citing the laws of “foreign” 
polities when there is a “genealogical” relationship between them.85 
Within this genealogical framework, some might argue that 
the use of foreign law is only permissible when a “daughter” polity 
cites the constitutional courts of its “parent,” and not the other way 
around. From this perspective, since the American Constitution 
predates most other national constitutions, the Supreme Court 
may not use foreign laws, while the America’s states, whose con-
stitutions often descended from one another, may cite across state 
borders.86 Yet under such logic, many states, such as the original 
thirteen colonies, would be barred from citing the law of other 
states. Moreover, if “descendant” polities may cite the contemporary 
law of their “parents” then the Supreme Court would be justified in 
citing the law of the modern United Kingdom. Accordingly, even 
the highly specific genealogical perspective offered above cannot ex-
plain why states may cite one another’s constitutions while nations 
may not. 
Text and Original Intentions
A further objection to the use of foreign law is the claim that 
a court may only cite foreign law if its constitution provides an 
unambiguous “constitutional license” for doing so.87 Internation-
ally, several constitutions, such as South Africa’s, include such ex-
plicit license provisions.88  America’s constitution offers no such 
explicit textual warrant.89 However, neither do any of America’s 
state constitutions.  Across fifty state constitutions, one finds no 
“South Africa”-style calls to cite sister state courts, suggesting that 
if America cannot look abroad, states may not look to one another.
 A more nuanced set of objections to foreign legal sources 
stems from the framework of original intentions. On the whole, 
supporters of original intent methodologies argue that the inten-
tions of a constitution’s drafters should hold priority as an interpre-
tive tool.90 Two broad categories of originalist perspectives must 
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be considered: “absolute,” or rigid originalists, and “soft,” or flexible 
originalists. For an absolute originalist, discerning the original in-
tentions of a constitution’s founders is the only valid interpretive 
path. Such a viewpoint clearly forecloses the citation of contempo-
rary foreign law, since such materials seldom explain what a con-
stitution’s original drafters intended when they adopted a given 
clause.91* However, for similar reasons, an absolute originalist 
would be unable to accept state court citation of non-state sources, 
since the state’s founders would have had no knowledge of modern 
non-state legal rulings.
 In contrast to absolute originalism, a soft originalist might 
argue that while the intentions of a constitution’s ratifiers are the 
best interpretive tool, if evidence of intent is lacking, other inter-
pretive methods can be used. Given the centuries of sustained 
scholarship surrounding the American Constitution’s founding 
period, one could plausibly argue that in many cases, evidence of 
the Founders’ intentions offers sufficient guidance to interpret the 
document.  Looking to state constitutions, however, one may face 
a steeper challenge. Often, there is a relative dearth of scholarship 
on the founding period of state governments,92 resulting in a “lack 
of adequate and available historical materials.”93 Because of this, 
discerning the original intentions behind state constitutions might 
sometimes pose a “nearly impossible task of questionable legitima-
cy.”94 In light of such challenges, a soft originalist might argue that 
when interpreting state constitutions, it is permissible to look to 
other states, since original intentions of state founders are often 
obscure.95 Accordingly, a soft originalist might conclude that state 
courts may cite one another, while the Supreme Court may not cite 
foreign law. 
Ultimately, however, even a soft originalist cannot clearly dif-
ferentiate between state use of non-state law and Supreme Court 
use of foreign law. Even if the intentions of the national founders 
are often clearer than those of state founders, this is not always 
*  Unless it can be argued that the original intent of the founders was for 
contemporary foreign law to be used to determine a standard, as would be true in 
an originalist reading of the South African Constitution. 
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 so.96 Many states, such as New Jersey, Hawaii, and Alaska, have 
charters that were ratified in the past seventy-five years, documents 
that are the subject of extensive and readily accessible public re-
cords. Intuitively, the “original intentions” of the authors of these 
documents seem far more accessible than those of America’s cen-
turies-dead Founders. Accordingly, if a soft originalist opposes the 
Supreme Court’s use of foreign law, he must also oppose a great 
deal of state court use of non-state law.
CONCLUSION: SAME DIFFERENCE
Having considered the leading objections to the use of for-
eign legal citations, one may thus conclude that none justifies per-
mitting states to apply the laws of other states while not allowing 
the Supreme Court to cite foreign law. Of course, this analysis 
cannot consider each and every possible difference between these 
practices, and so there remains the possibility that a framework not 
explored here might coherently justify treating these practices dif-
ferently. Given the scope and breadth of arguments considered by 
this analysis, however, such an outcome is decidedly unlikely.  
In this essay, I argued that concerns drawn from the prag-
matist legal framework may coherently justify accepting state court 
use of non-state law while rejecting the Supreme Court’s use of 
foreign law, but frameworks independent of such concerns do not. 
Because of the magnitude of such practical challenges, it is possible 
that such obstacles will not ever be fully overcome and, as a result, 
that there will always be at least some reason for rejecting the use of 
foreign law. That said, the conclusion reached in this analysis is still 
an important one. By indicating the similarity between these prac-
tices, this argument challenges the assumptions undergirding two 
well-known judicial behaviors. On one hand, the result reached 
suggests that the use of non-state law is vulnerable to a host of 
objections it is not normally associated with and, as such, may be 
more suspect than currently thought. The more plausible implica-
tion of this argument, however, is that the Supreme Court’s use of 
foreign law as persuasive authority is less problematic than gener-
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ally imagined. In suggesting the commonality between this fiercely 
controversial practice and a widely accepted one, this essay suggests 
that current attempts to demonize the use of foreign law may be 
inappropriate and ought to be reconsidered. Ultimately, though the 
divergence between nations may seem greater than the divergence 
between states, they are, in a meaningful sense, the same difference.
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